History
Advanced
Unit 3
Option D: The Challenge of Fascism

Monday 2 June 2014 – Morning
Time: 2 hours

You must have:
Sources Insert (enclosed)

Instructions
• Use black ink or ball-point pen.
• Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
• There are two sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A and one question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
• Answer the questions in the spaces provided – there may be more space than you need.

Information
• The total mark for this paper is 70.
• The marks for each question are shown in brackets – use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
• The quality of your written communication will be assessed in all your responses – you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.
• This paper has two unit codes. Unit 3 6HI03/F Topic D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45 is a prohibited combination with Unit 1 6HI01/F.

Advice
• Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
• Keep an eye on the time.
• Check your answers if you have time at the end.
6HI03/D – The Challenge of Fascism

SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3. Section B begins on page 11.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1  How far do you agree with the view that, in the years 1919–29, the democratic experiment in Germany must be seen as a success?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2  ‘Nazi war production in the years 1939–45 was essentially inefficient.’
   How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3  ‘Britain’s handling of the Abyssinian Crisis was confused and ultimately disastrous.’
   How far do you agree with these judgements?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4  To what extent can Britain’s conduct of the war in the years 1939–41 be seen as a success?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS
SECTION A

Put a cross in the box indicating the first question you have chosen to answer ☑. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☓ and then put a cross in another box ☑.

Chosen Question Number:

Question 1 ☐ Question 2 ☐
Question 3 ☐ Question 4 ☐
(Section A continued)
(Section A continued)

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(Section A continued)
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.

Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

To what extent were the decisions made by Germany’s leaders responsible for the outbreak of the First World War?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree that the Nazi regime was genuinely popular in Germany in the years 1933–39?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)
D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement during 1938 was a misjudgement?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that, at the end of the war, the chance was lost to improve the British economy?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS
SECTION B

Put a cross in the box indicating the second question you have chosen to answer. If you change your mind, put a line through the box and then put a cross in another box.

Chosen Question Number:

- [ ] Question 5
- [ ] Question 6
- [ ] Question 7
- [ ] Question 8
(Section B continued)
(Section B continued)
(Section B continued)
(Section B continued)
Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1
(From Mark Hewitson, Germany and the Causes of the First World War, published 2004)

The German army and the government pushed for war before 1914, even though significant sections of public opinion opposed the idea. This was a consequence of a belief in the ascendancy of the German nation-state, in the validity of war as an instrument of policy and in the decisiveness of power politics in international relations. The main impediment to war was effectively removed when Russia became Germany’s principal enemy during the winter of 1913, in place of France. Because tsarist autocracy and ‘Slav’ barbarity were traditionally detested by left liberals, socialists and democratic Catholics, the Reich government was able to undercut public opposition to war by casting Russia as the aggressor in July 1914. This did not mean that German leaders planned war, but rather they continued a policy of brinkmanship which had been framed against a supposedly weaker French state during the previous decade.

SOURCE 2
(From Ian Porter and Ian D. Armour, Imperial Germany 1890–1918, published 1991)

The argument of ‘preventative defence’, suggests that the Bethmann Hollweg government deliberately provoked a diplomatic crisis which it knew might lead to war. But this was because of a deep-rooted and understandable concern at Germany’s isolation, and fears of growing Russian strength. Central to this are two arguments: that the news of the Anglo-Russian naval talks had a decisive effect on shaping Bethmann Hollweg’s strategy, and that civilian and military leaders were much influenced by a deep pessimism as to Germany’s chances of survival, if it did not act before it was too late.

SOURCE 3
(From Norman Stone, Europe Transformed 1878–1919, published 1984)

The chief difficulty was that a quarrel between Austria and Serbia threatened to invoke alliances on both sides; indeed, the situation in which the First World War did break out was foreseen, in diplomats’ and generals’ exchanges, for five years beforehand. In the July Crisis of 1914, all of this came to a head. But it made no sense except in terms of a vast stepping-up of the arms race since 1911, and also in terms of a new, radical nationalism that had arisen in the same period. In the Great Powers, that process occurred in an atmosphere of increasing hysteria since 1890. Germany represented the most advanced case of this radical nationalism and hysteria.
SOURCE 4
(From Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich*, published 2001)

Faith in the Führer became a mass phenomenon. This was an unsurprising reaction in a divided country, where many felt their existence threatened by a succession of crises. They preferred a leap of faith to a rational understanding of their predicament. The Führer cult was as much in the eye of the beholder as in the tricks of Goebbels’ propaganda apparatus. People invested Hitler with properties he manifestly lacked. Contrary to any rational understanding of how a dictatorial party works, people believed in a Führer ‘without sin’, presiding over an army of little Hitlers of whom they were fully prepared to think the worst. Thus the murders of late June 1934 were widely approved of, or tolerated, on the grounds that the Führer had purged Rohm’s decadent homosexuals. This was a convenient moral rationalisation of murders that were wholly politically motivated. This process continued throughout the Third Reich.

SOURCE 5

Discontent about social and economic conditions was perfectly compatible with the recognition of other ‘achievements’ of the regime, in particular those attributable to Hitler himself. Much of this discontent, particularly from within the working class, was presumably expressed by those who had never been wholly won over to Nazism. However, everyday grievances based on material dissatisfaction, important though they were in forming popular attitudes, by no means necessarily signified total rejection of Nazism, or the Führer. He stood, in every sense, above and outside the system, detached from everyday dismal normality.

SOURCE 6

At the end of June 1935, there were some 23,000 political prisoners. By contrast, there were only a handful of SS concentration camps at this point, with around 3,500 inmates, not all of them political prisoners. In the late 1930s, the number of political detainees inside prisons declined: as resistance fell, so did convictions for treason. Meanwhile, as the German police made greater use of their powers to detain suspects, the result was an increase in the number of political prisoners inside SS camps. Among them were numerous convicts rearrested on their release from prison – a practice widely supported by the legal authorities. But unlike in the early Nazi camps, these inmates – wearing the red triangle on their uniforms – were often now outnumbered by other victims of Nazi repression.
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7
(From Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second World War, published 1977)

From late 1937, Hitler set Germany on a course of territorial expansion in central Europe. It was only after Hitler's annexation of rump Czechoslovakia in March 1939 that Britain and France began to consider stopping him by force. By encouraging Hitler to think that his territorial ambitions would not be opposed, Anglo-French appeasement contributed to the making of the Second World War. Although appeasement was not merely the personal policy of Neville Chamberlain, the offer of a colonial settlement to Germany in March 1938 and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in September were the main instances of his misjudgement. The essential error of the policy of appeasement lay in a readiness to make concessions without asking for concessions in return.

SOURCE 8
(From Richard Overy, The Origins of the Second World War, published 1998)

The Munich agreement represented a realistic assessment of the balance between western interests and western capabilities. That something vital had been at stake in the Czech crisis was not immediately obvious in 1938, when Chamberlain was universally hailed as the saviour of peace. It seemed to some that an element of stability might now be restored to European affairs. The Munich pact laid down the limited terms which Britain would accept for treaty revision in Europe, and it gave the appearance that Hitler had been compelled, like Beneš of Czechoslovakia, to accept Britain and France as final decision-makers in Europe. This fact above all persuaded Chamberlain that the prospect of a general settlement was not yet beyond his grasp.

SOURCE 9
(From David E. Kaiser, 'Hitler and the Coming of the War', in Gordon Martel, Modern Germany Reconsidered, 1870–1945, published 1992)

At Munich, rather than risk war with the Western powers, Hitler had taken advantage of their fear and their willingness to meet his nationalist claims to achieve a more limited victory. The lively and continuing debate over the wisdom of British appeasement has largely missed the point of the crisis over Czechoslovakia by assuming that it was Chamberlain, rather than Hitler, who decided against war. Yet the evidence we have suggests that Hitler, like his generals, recognised in 1938 that he could not yet fight Britain and France. Therefore, on 29 September he took what he could get without war. Had Paris and London recognised this, the crisis might have produced a different result. The crisis was an exercise in brinkmanship, one in which Hitler demonstrated superior skill.
The period of reconstruction planning for post-war Britain was undeniably the best opportunity to face the fundamental problems of British industry, but the chance was lost. Labour called for nationalisation, planning and an anti-monopoly policy. This collided with the Conservatives’ desire to allow industrialists to resolve their own problems in their own way, even if this meant continuing the market-sharing and price-fixing agreements of the 1930s. Additionally, vested interests had gained immense negative power since 1939. Trade union leaders and industrialists had been drawn into the making and execution of production policy. This gave trade unionists the power to block changes in the collective bargaining system. Furthermore, plans for radical industrial reform were blunted by opposition from industrialists, with whom the government needed to keep good relations in order to accelerate peacetime production and exploit Britain’s head start over its continental rivals.

Because Germany and Japan were too shattered by the war to compete, England had an excellent opportunity to secure new export markets. Pushed on by the government, British exporters made great efforts and were successful at least for a time. It has been suggested that the demand for their goods was so strong in these post-war years that they fell into bad habits and assumed that the customer would put up with anything. As a result, when the Germans and the Japanese returned to world markets, they did not find it too hard to win customers away from the British.

The difficulties of quickly switching the economy back to peacetime production, the backlog of demand built up during the war, and the continuation of public spending at a high level, mainly because of the new welfare plans, all added up to the pressure of demand and the risk of a very rapid inflation. These difficulties, however, were overcome with assistance from the United States. Manufacturing output recovered, exports were expanded enormously and the export gap closed. Strikes remained illegal under wartime regulations, rationing and many physical controls stayed in force to restrain consumption and direct investment, interest rates were kept at 2% and the trade unions accepted wage restraint. A measure of the success of reconstruction was the fact that Britain still accounted for 25% of exports of world manufacturers in 1951.
Acknowledgments


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