Instructions

• Use black ink or ball-point pen.
• Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
• There are two sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A and one question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
• Answer the questions in the spaces provided – there may be more space than you need.

Information

• The total mark for this paper is 70.
• The marks for each question are shown in brackets – use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.
• The quality of your written communication will be assessed in all your responses – you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.
• This paper has two unit codes. Unit 3 6HI03/F Topic D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45 is a prohibited combination with Unit 1 6HI01/F.

Advice

• Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
• Check your answers if you have time at the end.
6H103/D – The Challenge of Fascism

SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3.
Section B begins on page 11.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1 ‘In the years 1900–1914, the impact of Germany’s economic development was wholly positive.’

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2 How far do you agree with the view that Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in 1933 came about primarily as a result of the misjudgements of Weimar politicians in the years 1929–33?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3 How far do you agree with the view that British foreign policy towards Germany in the years 1933–37 was sensible, given the circumstances?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4 How far do you agree with the view that the success of the D-Day landings and subsequent liberation of Europe was primarily due to the impact of the bomber offensive of 1942–45?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS
SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☑. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☑ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☑.

Chosen question number:

Question 1 ☐  Question 2 ☐
Question 3 ☐  Question 4 ☐
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.

Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5  Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that a German desire for war cannot be seen as the main cause of the First World War?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6  Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that ‘Hitler’s power was constrained by the very system he had created’ (Source 4, lines 42–43)?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)
D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that Chamberlain defended the national interest as best he could in the years 1937–39?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the wartime experience created a new resolve ‘to build, from the sacrifices of war, a better society’ (Source 10, lines 34–35)?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS
SECTION B
Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box □. If you change your mind, put a line through the box □ and then indicate your new question with a cross □.

Chosen question number:  
Question 5  □  Question 6  □
Question 7  □  Question 8  □
(Section B continued)
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1
(From Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War, published 1928)

Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, made friendly arrangements with Germany in regard to the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese colonies. He then thought it prudent to counter-balance these arrangements by consenting to the desire of his two Entente friends to enter into negotiations for an Anglo-Russian naval convention. Germany also found herself frequently embarrassed by the “stupidities” in which Austria indulged in the Balkans, against Germany’s better judgment or without her approval. Within each group special efforts were continually being made to lessen the friction and suspicion, and to increase the harmony and security of the group. The assent or encouragement which France gave to Russia, and which Germany gave to Austria, is to be explained more by this desire to preserve the solidarity of the group, rather than by any desire for a war to recover Alsace-Lorraine in the one case, or to gain the dominance over Europe in the other.

SOURCE 2
(From Geoff Layton, From Bismarck to Hitler: Germany 1890–1933, published 1995)

Fischer maintains that the ‘excitement and bitterness of nationalist opinion over what was seen to be the humiliating outcome of the [Moroccan] crisis were profound and enduring’. 1911 marks an important watershed in German foreign policy because from that point there existed a clear continuity of German aims and policies which culminated in the war of August 1914. With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, Germany’s main ally, Austria-Hungary, was threatened by an increasingly powerful and nationalistic Serbia, which in turn was backed by Russia. With Britain committed to stand by France unconditionally in the event of a continental war, the summoning of Germany’s army and navy chiefs took place on 8 December 1912.
SOURCE 3
(From David E. Kaiser, Germany and the Origins of the First World War, published 1997)

No pro-war consensus developed in Berlin in any of the major pre-1914 crises. Bülow encouraged the ideal of Weltpolitik, but never allowed it to carry him away. Under Bethmann Hollweg, Weltpolitik was of considerably less domestic use; after 1909 new divisions within German society and politics made it impossible for the government to use foreign policy to increase its domestic support. Bethmann too feared the domestic consequences of war, and knew in 1914 that a conflict was likely to weaken Germany’s political structure rather than strengthen it. But Bethmann in 1914 risked war because of a mistaken belief that Germany’s international position demanded it. Sharing the widespread conviction that German expansion was necessary and estimating that Germany’s chances for success were diminishing, the Chancellor made decisions that led directly to war.
D1 – From Kaiser to Führer: Germany, 1900–45

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4
(From Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, published 1991)

The Third Reich remained impossibly ‘polycratic’. Political power was unevenly distributed between Hitler, rising and falling Nazi leaders, the party, the state, old Weimar and new Nazi offices, central, regional and local authorities, the police, the SS and the army. Some commentators have gone so far as to talk of the ‘institutional anarchy’ of the Third Reich or its confusion of ‘rival hierarchies’. Even if this may be an exaggeration, the regime’s political apparatus was characterized by extensive duplication of authority. Hitler’s power was constrained by the very system he had created to the point where some experts of ‘structuralist’ persuasion argue that he was in effect a ‘weak dictator’ within it.

SOURCE 5
(From Alan Bullock, Personality in History: Stalin and Hitler, published 1994)

Hitler was not interested in the day-to-day business of government, and more and more withdrew from it, concentrating his attention on his long-term interests of foreign policy, rearmament and war. Hitler left the more powerful of the Nazi leaders – Goering, Himmler, Goebbels, Ley – free not only to build up rival empires but to feud with each other and with the established ministries in a continuing fight to take over parts of each other’s territory. Such a state of affairs suited Hitler very well, allowing him to make arbitrary interventions whenever he chose to, so keeping the civil service uncertain of his intentions. At the same time he outflanked it by setting up special agencies for tasks he regarded as urgent.

SOURCE 6
(From Frank McDonough, Hitler and Nazi Germany, published 1999)

The German constitution under Nazi rule became ‘the will of the Führer’, carried out by a Nazi elite of ministers, free of any political restraints from parliament, the press or pressure groups. At the top of the Nazi political system was the Führer, who had, in theory at least, unlimited state power. Hitler saw the Nazi state as an instrument of his own unlimited power over the Nazi Party and the German nation. Orders were given by the Führer and followed without discussion. The key to power and influence in Nazi Germany was having access to, and support from, Hitler. In reality, in spite of his claims about government in Nazi Germany being one omnipotent will, decision making was channelled through a Nazi elite and a multiplicity of conflicting and overlapping organisations.
Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7
(From Peter Neville, *Neville Chamberlain: A Maligned Prime Minister?*, published 1992)

In the early postwar decades the accusation that Chamberlain betrayed the national interest became a truism, but by the 1960s it was under challenge. Now, despite the perfectly valid criticisms which can be made of the appeasement policy under Chamberlain, it cannot just be written off as cowardly. Throughout his tenure, Chamberlain was confronted with the impending threat of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. A war which, it should be added, his military advisers were adamant that Britain could not win. Hence Chamberlain's evolution of the policy of the 'double line', which involved trying to achieve better relations with the fascist powers while also pushing ahead with rearmament. It is also true, that in not seeing Eastern Europe as a 'vital British interest', Chamberlain was absolutely in the tradition of British foreign policy since 1919.

SOURCE 8

It is doubtful whether Hitler ever took Chamberlain's sincerity seriously before Munich; it is certain that he did not do so a few days afterwards. What was meant as appeasement had turned into capitulation. Hitler drew the lesson that threats were his most potent weapon. Hitler no longer expected to make gains by parading his grievances against Versailles; he expected to make them by playing on British and French fears. Thus he confirmed the suspicions of those who attacked Munich as a cowardly surrender. However, Hitler lost the moral advantage which had hitherto made him irresistible. Munich became an emotive word, a symbol of shame.

SOURCE 9
(From Richard Cockett, *Appeasement: Britain's Prime Minister in the Dock*, published 1994)

Chamberlain's predecessors had done nothing about putting the principles of appeasement into practice. In this, Chamberlain's initiative was too little, far too late. Chamberlain never appreciated this, and his capacity for self-delusion was quite extraordinary if it helped him to believe that his fixation was still valid and intact. Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the Admiralty, resigned from the Cabinet because he could not believe that the secession of the Sudetenland to Germany would bring 'peace in our time'. All that Chamberlain's appeasement did in practice was to swell Hitler's appetite. It is true that Hitler did not want a world war in 1939, but that was only because since 1936 he had come to expect a complete lack of resistance to any of his territorial acquisitions.
D2 – Britain and the Challenge of Fascism: Saving Europe at a Cost? c1925–60

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10
(From David Thomson, England in the Twentieth Century, published 1965)

Experience of evacuation, of mutual aid in air-raids, of great collective sacrifice and service, of stringent rationing and controls in the cause of so great a common effort made the pre-war years of insecurity and social hardship seem in retrospect grossly unjust. A new resolve was born to build, from the sacrifices of war, a better society wherein none should be deprived of the necessities of life, and where the opportunity to work and live in decent surroundings should be opened to all citizens. The sense of national purpose, rediscovered in war, began to be transferred to this goal. Victory could serve the ends of social justice. Necessities, as well as sociological ideals, pointed to new tasks of reconstruction and planning. Britain’s economy had become, in effect, highly planned.

SOURCE 11
(From Ross McKibbin, Classes and Cultures: England 1918–1951, published 1998)

The Conservative Party had been overthrown quite unexpectedly in 1945, and the Labour government had carried through a programme of social welfare and nationalization which would have seemed impossible in 1939. However, the institutions of civil society were almost wholly identical and the old ‘ideological apparatus of the state’ largely intact. Outside the realm of social services or nationalized industries, the visitor would have not observed a social democracy. The Attlee government operated deeply, but on a narrow front. For instance, it abolished the voluntary hospitals but left intact an independent education sector which guaranteed those who attended it a privileged access to both public and private markets without equal in any comparable country. This enormously reinforced social stratification. It also encouraged the development of a system of secondary education in which Labour’s working-class supporters were definitely not favoured.

SOURCE 12
(From Roy Hattersley, Fifty Years On: A Prejudiced History of Britain Since the War, published 1998)

The welfare programme was so widely accepted that when, in 1951, the Conservatives came back to power, the Tory government had no choice but to continue the social revolution of 1945. The consensus over the need to protect and extend the social programme ensured that spending on health, education and social security was adequately, if not generously, funded for the rest of the decade, and that capital investment in housing was maintained at its post-war level. The Labour government’s recovery programme had been undoubtedly assisted by the acceptance of wartime rationing and regulation, and its work was immensely helped by the spirit of the time. But the high hopes for the nationalised industries, ‘managed on behalf of the people’, were not always realised.