Write your name here

Surname	Other names

Pearson Edexcel GCE

Centre Number | Candidate Number

History

Advanced
Unit 3

Option E: War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

Monday 8 June 2015 – Morning
Time: 2 hours

Paper Reference
6HI03/E

You must have:
Sources Insert (enclosed)

Total Marks

Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- There are two sections in this question paper. Answer **one** question from Section A and **one** question from Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided – *there may be more space than you need.*

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 70.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets – *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*
- The quality of your written communication will be assessed in **all** your responses – *you should take particular care with your spelling, punctuation and grammar, as well as the clarity of expression.*

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

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6HI03/E – War and Peace: Twentieth Century International Relations

SECTION A

Answer ONE question in Section A on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section A on page 3.
Section B begins on page 11.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Answer EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2.

EITHER

1 Why were the Great Powers able to resolve international crises peacefully in the years 1905–13 but unable to prevent the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914?

(Total for Question 1 = 30 marks)

OR

2 'The peace treaties of 1919–23 were primarily based on the victorious powers' desire for reconciliation.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 2 = 30 marks)

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Answer EITHER Question 3 OR Question 4.

EITHER

3 'The development of the nuclear arms race massively increased US-Soviet tensions in the years 1949–63.'

How far do you agree with this view?

(Total for Question 3 = 30 marks)

OR

4 Why, and how significantly, did US-Soviet relations improve in the 1970s?

(Total for Question 4 = 30 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS

SECTION A

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number: **Question 1** ☐ **Question 2** ☐

Question 3 ☐ **Question 4** ☐

(Section A continued)

(Section A continued)

(Section A continued)

(Section A continued)

(Section A continued)

(Section A continued)

(Section A continued)

TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 30 MARKS

SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

You should start the answer to your chosen question in Section B on page 13.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 5 OR Question 6.

EITHER

5 Use Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that the League of Nations failed during the inter-war period because of Anglo-French divisions?

Explain your answer, using Sources 1, 2 and 3 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 5 = 40 marks)

OR

6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge.

How far do you agree with the view that US-Japanese conflict in 1941 was mainly caused by a 'fundamental clash of competing systems' (Source 4, line 32)?

Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Study the relevant sources in the Sources Insert.
Answer EITHER Question 7 OR Question 8.

EITHER

7 Use Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge.

'US expansionism was primarily responsible for the development of the Cold War in the years 1945–53.'

How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 7, 8 and 9 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 7 = 40 marks)

OR

8 Use Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge.

'The Cold War came to an end in the late 1980s mainly due to the moral bankruptcy of communism in the Soviet bloc.'

How far do you agree with this view?

Explain your answer, using Sources 10, 11 and 12 and your own knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

(Total for Question 8 = 40 marks)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS

SECTION B

Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ☒. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ☒ and then indicate your new question with a cross ☒.

Chosen question number: **Question 5** ☐ **Question 6** ☐

Question 7 ☐ **Question 8** ☐

(Section B continued)

(Section B continued)

(Section B continued)

(Section B continued)

(Section B continued)

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(Section B continued)

(Section B continued)

(Section B continued)

TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 40 MARKS
TOTAL FOR PAPER = 70 MARKS

Pearson Edexcel GCE

History

Advanced
Unit 3

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Sources Insert – Section B

Paper Reference

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Do not return the insert with the question paper.

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Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 5

SOURCE 1
(From Ruth Henig, *The League of Nations*, published 2010)

Divisions between Britain and France had already undermined the effectiveness of the League in the 1920s, during the Corfu dispute and over the discussions around the formulation of the Geneva Protocol. The complete failure of Britain and France to agree on a common approach to deal with the aggressive ambitions of Mussolini and of Hitler, robbed the League of any remaining claim to be able to maintain international peace through collective action. After the failure to protect Abyssinia against Italian aggression its credibility was completely destroyed. 'New League methods' were now discarded in favour of 'old diplomacy' which sanctioned the absorption of Austria by Germany in March 1938, and negotiated the Munich Agreement in the autumn of that year.

SOURCE 2
(From John M. Murrin et al., *Liberty, Equality, Power: A History of the American People*, published 2009)

The mere fact of U.S. membership in the League would not have magically solved Europe's post-war problems. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: no stable international order could have arisen after the First World War without the full involvement of the United States. The League of Nations required American authority and prestige in order to operate effectively as an international parliament. We cannot know whether the League, with American involvement, would have rehabilitated the Germans; nor whether an American-led League would have stopped Hitler's expansionism before it escalated into full-scale war in 1939. Still, it seems fair to suggest that American participation would have strengthened the League and improved its ability to bring lasting peace to Europe.

SOURCE 3
(From Sally Marks, *The Ebbing of European Ascendancy: An International History of the World 1914–1945*, published 2002)

The League could not fulfil its primary goal of preserving peace because it lacked power. It was often paralysed by the unanimity requirement and lacked ability to cope with defiance by a great or even regional power. It was disowned by Washington. Even London and Paris often maintained only a distant relationship, providing lip service for the sake of public opinion. Though France had hoped to make the League a real instrument to preserve the *status quo*, London's view was that it should be an international round table but not an international War Office. Like other powers, Britain had no objection to delay and discussion – but not where its own vital interests were concerned. As state sovereignty remained intact, there was no way to ensure co-operation with, or obedience to, the League. The great powers ignored Geneva, deciding great matters elsewhere among themselves.

E1 – The World in Crisis, 1879–1941

Sources for use with Question 6

SOURCE 4
(From Mary Beth Norton et al., *A People and A Nation: A History of the United States*, published 2007)

A fundamental clash of competing systems explains why war came. Japan preferred a world divided into closed spheres of influence. The United States wanted a liberal capitalist world order, where all nations enjoyed freedom of trade and investment. American principles advocated respect for human rights but the militarists in Asia disregarded such rights. The United States valued its democratic system; Japan embraced military-backed authoritarian regimes. When the United States protested against Japanese expansion, Tokyo argued that Washington was applying a double standard, conveniently ignoring its own Latin American sphere of influence and its own history of military and economic expansionism. Americans rejected such comparisons and claimed that their expansionism had benefited not just themselves, but the rest of the world. These incompatible objectives and outlooks obstructed diplomacy and made war likely.

SOURCE 5
(From Richard Overy, *The Road To War*, published 1999)

Pearl Harbor was not knowingly left by the US government to face the Japanese in the hope that it would shock American opinion into supporting war. Roosevelt did not want to wage war at all if it could be avoided, or at least not until America was armed. Furthermore, the American defence effort was concentrated in the Atlantic, and a Pacific war would have seriously compromised that priority. Ultimately, it was down to American miscalculation about Japan's intention and capability: Americans did not believe that Japan would attack the US head on. This view was based on the genuine American conviction that Japan lacked the military means to launch precise, devastating, long-range attacks with small numbers of trained pilots. Japan, for once, profited from the persistent American habit of underestimating Japanese potential.

SOURCE 6
(From Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991*, published 1994)

Probably Japan could not have avoided war with the USA unless it had given up the aim of establishing a powerful economic empire (the so-called 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere'), which was the very essence of its policy. In fact, it was the American embargo on Japanese trade and freezing of Japanese assets, which forced Japan to take action to prevent its economy (entirely dependent on overseas imports) from being strangled. The gamble Japan took was dangerous, and proved suicidal. Japan seized perhaps its only opportunity to establish its southern empire quickly; but since it calculated that this required the immobilisation of the American navy, the only force that could intervene, it also meant that the USA with its overwhelmingly superior forces and resources would immediately be drawn into war.

Sources for use with Section B. Answer ONE question in Section B on the topic for which you have been prepared.

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 7

SOURCE 7
(From J. P. D. Dunbabin, *The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies*, published 2008)

The real expansionist power had been the United States. Driven by an economic need for markets, and by a liberal-capitalist world view, the US monopolised the occupation of Japan and excluded the USSR from influence in Italy. The US also soon gave up trying to work with the USSR in Germany. But while acting unilaterally in its own sphere, the US would not grant Stalin the right to do likewise in his. The USA misinterpreted as expansionist Soviet moves that sought only to secure for the USSR a limited defensive position; and America's ideology led it to foster in Eastern Europe and elsewhere a political and social system incompatible with Soviet security.

SOURCE 8
(From Ralph B. Levering et al., *Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives*, published 2001)

The USSR's overriding goal was remarkably consistent throughout the Cold War: security through expansion and consolidation of the Soviet sphere. Whether they were guided primarily by Marxist ideology or by national security interests is an artificial distinction. Ideology made the Soviet leaders predisposed to see U.S. policies as expansionist and threatening. Yet, in the communist mentality, ideology and national interests were blended into a single whole, since for Stalin the preservation and expansion of the Soviet domain were necessary for promoting world revolution. One could ask how differently East-West relations would have developed had Stalin avoided provocative acts in areas such as Turkey, Iran, Manchuria, and Korea. But, overall, Stalin was basically cautious in the Cold War; he sometimes came close to, but never crossed, the fatal line of direct military collision with the US.

SOURCE 9
(From Michael L. Dockrill and Michael F. Hopkins, *The Cold War, 1945–1991*, published 2006)

The steady stream of Soviet actions in Eastern and Central Europe, in Germany, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in Iran, aroused Truman's fears about Stalin's ultimate ambitions. Collectively they appeared to the US as a deliberate programme designed to undermine Western influence in areas bordering the Soviet Union as a prelude to a complete communist take-over. The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, following Mao Tse-tung's victory in China in 1949 and the Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb in the same year, were regarded as further blows to American security. The intervention of communist China in the Korean War in November 1950 convinced Truman that the war had been engineered by Moscow as a means of distracting the United States' attention from Europe. American forces in both Europe and Korea were strengthened.

E2 – A World Divided: Superpower Relations, 1944–90

Sources for use with Question 8

SOURCE 10
(From John Lewis Gaddis, *On Starting All Over Again: A Naïve Approach to the Study of the Cold War*, published 2000)

When, in 1983, Ronald Reagan denounced the Soviet Union as the 'focus of evil in the modern world', his speech appalled most academic experts on the Cold War. It was a striking departure from an official rhetoric, extending back to the 1960s, that had portrayed the USSR as operating within the same moral universe as the Western democracies. It is clear now, though, that citizens of the Soviet Union and its East European satellites saw the 'evil empire' speech rather differently. By the end of the 1980s, many of them had come to agree with Reagan that the regime under which they lived was, if not evil, then certainly illegitimate.

SOURCE 11
(From Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*, published 2009)

Ronald Reagan, having staked out a hard-line posture during much of his first term, shifted course – modestly before Gorbachev assumed power in Moscow, and more radically thereafter. Grasping the logic of containment, Reagan combined a confidence in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union with a determination to avoid warlike stances that could rally the militarists in Moscow. Eventually grasping the logic of diplomacy, he talked to Gorbachev. Using the tactic of stick and carrot, and the humanising effect of direct and personal negotiation, Reagan encouraged the Soviet leader to continue his policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*. Neoconservatives in Washington objected, and some of the President's aides, such as Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, urged a more aggressive stance. But Reagan, backed by his Secretary of State George Shultz, stood his ground. That diplomatic determination helped make possible the astonishing scenes of jubilation in eastern Europe in 1989.

SOURCE 12
(From David S. Painter, *The Cold War: An International History*, published 1999)

Gorbachev inherited a situation characterized by declining economic performance, a widening technology gap with the West, an increasingly demoralised population, and a confrontational and counterproductive foreign policy. Economic growth in the Soviet bloc began to slow in the early 1970s and never recovered. The inability of the Soviet Union's economy to compete with the West restricted its citizens' standard of living, threatened its national security, and ultimately eroded the legitimacy of the communist system. Ending the Cold War and forging a less competitive relationship with the West would lower defence spending and allow the Soviet Union to focus resources on internal economic reform. Moreover, Gorbachev and his colleagues believed that continued coercive control of Eastern Europe was incompatible with democratisation and economic reform in the Soviet Union.

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