A-level
HISTORY

Component 2T  The Crisis of Communism: the USSR and the Soviet Empire, 1953–2000

Friday 16 June 2017  Morning  Time allowed: 2 hours 30 minutes

Materials
For this paper you must have:
• an AQA 16-page answer book.

Instructions
• Use black ink or black ball-point pen.
• Write the information required on the front of your answer book. The Paper Reference is 7042/2T.
• Answer three questions.
   In Section A answer Question 01.
   In Section B answer two questions.

Information
• The marks for questions are shown in brackets.
• The maximum mark for this paper is 80.
• You will be marked on your ability to:
   – use good English
   – organise information clearly
   – use specialist vocabulary where appropriate.

Advice
• You are advised to spend about:
   – 60 minutes on Question 01
   – 45 minutes on each of the two questions in Section B.
Section A

Answer Question 01.

Source A

From an address to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) by IK Polozkov, January 1991. Polozkov was First Secretary of the Russian Federation.

It is now clear to everybody that the perestroika, conceived and launched by the Party and people in 1985, to renew socialism, extend democracy and improve the people’s welfare, has not taken place. The so-called democrats have managed to alter the aims of perestroika and seize the initiative from our Party. Society is at a crossroads. The people have been deprived of their past, their present is crumbling, and nobody has yet said anything about what the future holds. We must admit that the CPSU did not spot the beginnings of the degeneration of perestroika in time, and allowed the process to gather momentum. It took a while for the Party to realise that it was abandoning its historical destiny – that is to say, defending the interests of working people. The Party slowly realised it was being taught to accept meekly the business class that was being artificially implanted at the expense of working people, and that a social base was being created for political movements which had no interest in socialist aims.

Source B

From an account of the events of 19–21 August 1991 in Moscow, by a 22-year-old student. It was published in 1993 as part of a collection of eye-witness accounts.

On the morning of 19 August, I was asleep. It was the vacation. A few of my friends called me on the telephone to tell me Gorbachev had been removed from power. I told them to stop messing around and let me get some rest. More calls came in. I got up and switched on the TV. Every channel was showing ‘Swan Lake’, not normal programmes. I tried to find out what was going on. I liked what the first statements of the State Committee on the State of Emergency said. I thought that people had been found who would restore order in the country. I thought Yeltsin had already been arrested, that a case was being prepared against him, and that maybe he would end up against a wall facing a firing squad. At that time I took everything very seriously, thinking that it was a real coup. Now, I think the events of 19–21 August were just a show.
Source C

From a book by Vladimir Zhironovsky, an extreme nationalist political leader, published in Moscow in 1993.

August 1991 in Moscow was awful. Armoured personnel carriers were going under the bridge along Kalinin Avenue when a crowd of furious, half-drunk Muscovites stopped one, dragged out the driver, and tried to set fire to it. Wasn’t this barbarous behaviour? Even if deploying troops was in some way unjustified and in some ways barbarous, wasn’t it even more barbarous to attack the troops and commit violence against them? Three Muscovites would not have been killed if there hadn’t been such an artificial clash and attempts to whip up hatred. These lads, the tank drivers, weren’t threatening anybody; they just climbed out of their vehicles, bought ice-creams and chatted with the girls. These were our lads, our army. And this is what was used to provoke hostile actions and whip up conflict. It wasn’t the State Emergency Committee that did this, but the ‘Democratic Russia’ people; certain adventurist elements who wanted to make the situation worse.

With reference to these sources and your understanding of the historical context, assess the value of these three sources to an historian studying the August coup of 1991. [30 marks]
Section B

Answer two questions.

02 ‘Nikita Khrushchev was overthrown in 1964 despite his mostly successful policies.’

Assess the validity of this view. [25 marks]

03 To what extent was the 1968 Prague Spring similar to the 1956 Hungarian Rising?

[25 marks]

04 ‘Instability in the satellite states in the years 1981 to 1989 was due to Western influences.’

Assess the validity of this view. [25 marks]

END OF QUESTIONS

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