Instructions

- Use black ink or ball-point pen.
- Fill in the boxes at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- You must answer three questions on the option for which you have been prepared.
- There are three sections in this question paper. Answer one question from Section A, one question from Section B and one question from Section C.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided – there may be more space than you need.

Information

- The total mark for this paper is 60.
- The marks for each question are shown in brackets – use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.

Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.
SECTION A

Choose EITHER Question 1 OR Question 2 for which you have been prepared.

You must start your answer on page 3.

Option 37.1: The changing nature of warfare, 1859–1991: perception and reality

Study Source 1 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

1 Assess the value of the source for revealing the nature of the British attack at Cambrai in November 1917 and its impact on the German defenders.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 1 = 20 marks)

Option 37.2: Germany, 1871–1990: united, divided and reunited

Study Source 2 in the Sources Booklet before you answer this question.

2 Assess the value of the source for revealing the perceived threat of the SA and the nature of Hitler’s response to it.

Explain your answer, using the source, the information given about its origin and your own knowledge about the historical context.

(Total for Question 2 = 20 marks)
SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B on the option for which you have been prepared.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

Option 37.1: The changing nature of warfare, 1859–1991: perception and reality

EITHER

3 How far do you agree that the leadership of Von Moltke was the most important factor in explaining Prussian military success in the years 1859–70?

(Total for Question 3 = 20 marks)

OR

4 How far do you agree that Enigma and British code breaking was the key factor in the victory in the battle of the Atlantic in the years 1939–45?

(Total for Question 4 = 20 marks)

Option 37.2: Germany, 1871–1990: united, divided and reunited

EITHER

5 How far do you agree that the Kulturkampf failed to achieve its objectives in the years 1871–79?

(Total for Question 5 = 20 marks)

OR

6 How significant was the role of Helmut Kohl, in the years 1989–90, in the reunification of Germany?

(Total for Question 6 = 20 marks)
SECTION C

Answer ONE question in Section C on the option for which you have been prepared.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

Option 37.1: The changing nature of warfare, 1859–1991: perception and reality

EITHER

7 How far do you agree that the Gettysburg Address set the pattern for official attempts to shape the public perception of war in the years 1859–1991?

(Total for Question 7 = 20 marks)

OR

8 How far do you agree that the reporting of the Tet Offensive had the most significant impact of any report from a battlefront in the years 1859–1991?

(Total for Question 8 = 20 marks)

Option 37.2: Germany, 1871–1990: united, divided and reunited

EITHER

9 How far do you agree that the number and the significance of white collar workers grew steadily in the years 1871–1990?

(Total for Question 9 = 20 marks)

OR

10 ‘Membership of the European Economic Community and the Common Agricultural Policy had the most significant impact on the economy of Germany in the years 1871–1990.’

How far do you agree with this statement?

(Total for Question 10 = 20 marks)
Sources for use with Section A.

Answer the question in Section A on the option for which you have been prepared.

Option 37.1: The changing nature of warfare, 1859–1991: perception and reality

Source for use with Question 1.

Source 1: From a report written by 2nd Lieutenant A Saucker of the German 84th infantry regiment. Saucker had fought on the Somme in 1916 and at Ypres in 1917. Here he describes the opening stages of the British attack in the battle of Cambrai, 20 November 1917.

The bombardment started at 6.20am and the British artillery appeared to have our range from the start. Their shells seemed to explode on contact with the ground and clouds of white smoke obscured our view. A wounded man from our 7th company approached us and gasped, 'The British have got tanks!' The impact of this on the morale of my men was clear. They had been confident that the enemy would once more perish on our barbed wire but now we could see that large stretches of it had been cleanly cut. We all rushed to the front and saw a giant machine heading straight for us. There was a momentary indecision but we then fired shot after shot. This appeared to have no effect and the tank trundled forward. I could now see a whole chain of these steel monsters advancing. The ground was drier than at Ypres and made progress easier.

I watched one tank which displayed a flag as a recognition mark and had some sort of attachment on its front. It approached the trench and, when it reached the edge, the attachment suddenly fell vertically. My first impression was that the tank had been hit and damaged and I could hardly believe my eyes when it continued to grind forward. There could be no doubt that it had crossed the trench and was pressing on. What I had seen must have been a large wooden object or a great bundle of sticks, which it had released at the appropriate moment to cross the trench. We were not sure how to react as we had come to believe that our defence system was impenetrable. We opened up again with every barrel focusing on these monstrous opponents. If only their infantry had put in an appearance. We could have dealt with men of flesh and blood like ourselves, but we were defenceless against these armoured machines.
Source for use with Question 2.

Source 2: From a speech made by Adolf Hitler to the Reichstag, 13 July 1934. Hitler is reporting on the events concerning the SA which had taken place on 30 June 1934. The events became known as the Night of the Long Knives.

The SA had become revolutionaries and aimed to create a permanent state of revolution in Germany. They were planning to pursue Communist policies, which would have shattered our economic system and brought poverty and ruin to all our people.

The SA had also established contact with General von Schleicher* with the intention of gaining control of our Armed Forces. I would never have appointed an SA leader to supreme command and this conspiracy put the State into great danger. There should be only one bearer of arms in our State, the German Army, and it must not be subject to political control.

It was clear to me that the SA's plans went against what National Socialism stands for and threatened the very survival of our State. I had a number of serious talks with the Chief Secretary of the SA, Röhm, from the beginning of April onwards. I became increasingly concerned about both his character and his lack of loyalty to our cause.

During May, it became obvious that the SA had ambitious plans which, had they become a reality, would have resulted in violent disruption. Röhm and his gang broke every law of decency in their personal conduct and their poison began to spread. There was evidence of plots in Berlin, in Silesia and in Saxony.

By the end of June, I resolved that it was my duty to act to put an end to these monstrous developments and that lightning action was essential. The course of action that I initiated had the sole purpose of preserving the strength, stability and prosperity of the State. I had been lenient for too long and this could not continue. Mutiny and treason can only be crushed by ruthless action.

If anyone asks why we did not call upon the regular courts, my answer is this: 'In that hour, I was responsible for the fate of the German Nation. I gave the order to shoot those responsible for the threat and to burn out the poison that they had spread.'

*General von Schleicher – German military commander who had been a leading politician in the Weimar period