Pearl Harbor

The Road to Pearl Harbor

Almost from start of WW2 USA and Japan on collision course
US alarmed by Japan’s aggressive designs
Anxious to find way to restrain her
Yet Administration just as cautious and hesitant as it was towards Germany
FDR not willing to allow Japan to dominate South East Asia but because of strength of isolationism and his own revulsion against war he did no more than react against Japan’s moves

Japanese Moves

Spring 1940 after Nazi triumphs in Europe had whetted Japanese appetites
France and Netherlands prostrate – they saw chance to extend their ‘New Order’ in East Asia
Stepped up the war against China
Coveted French Indochina and Dutch East Indies for oil and rubber
Pressured GB into closing Burma Road – chief supply route to Nationalist China
Forced Vichy France to grant them bases in northern Indochina
September 1940 military alliance with Italy and Germany
US public opinion averse to war with Japan but favoured denying them raw materials needed in war with China
FDR gradually applied economic sanctions

US measures against Japan

July 1940 banned export without licence of strategic materials especially oil
September absolute embargo on all scrap iron and steel except to Western hemisphere and GB
December cut off machine tools, chemicals and certain other vital war materials
Increased aid to China
Encouraged GB to open Burma Road (they did)
Warned Japan of consequences of any move against GB or Dutch colonies

Japanese reaction to FDR’s next moves

None of these steps had much effect on Japanese expansionists
What deterred them for a while was fear that if Japan was at war with US, the Soviets would attack Manchurian border
Japanese – Soviet Neutrality Act of April 1941 and then invasion of Russia by Hitler two months later removed that threat
Japanese made fresh demands on Vichy to secure bases in south Indochina
Seemed to portend an attack on Malaya and Dutch East Indies
26^th July FDR froze all Japanese assets in US
Also closed Panama Canal to Japanese ships
Philippine militia mobilised
August 1^st banned oil exports to Japan
GB and Dutch did same
It meant virtually a world-wide oil embargo on Japan
Japanese oil reserves would last only 18 months at most
Japan either had to abandon its expansion or go to war to get supplies

Negotiations

Militarists wanted to continue but the navy was anxious to avoid a war they might lose
Prime Minister Konoye continued with attempt to negotiate settlement with US
Japan ready to promise they’d refrain from further expansion in SE Asia and would withdraw from Indochina on settlement of the ‘China Incident’
In return they demanded: an end to aid for China; unfreezing of Japan’s assets; restoration of oil supplies
September 3^rd 1941 US rejected the demands and insisted Japan withdraw from China and end Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy
FDR’s critics say he was hell-bent on war and that he rejected Konoye’s proposals to provoke Japan into striking first blow
FDR wanted peace in Pacific but not at China’s expense
He and his advisors convinced Japan bluffing
His inflexibility was a godsend to the military in Japan

Last Ditch Negotiations and War

September 6^th 1941 Imperial Conference in Tokyo agreed to give diplomacy one last chance
If no agreement by early October they would resort to war
This was extended to December later
Negotiations continued right up to outbreak of war but neither side would budge on the issue of China
November 26^th after rejection of their final terms Japanese cabinet confirmed decision to go to war
December 7^th Japanese carriers attacked Pearl Harbor Hawaii without declaring war
Also attacked Siam, Philippines, Malaya and Dutch East Indies
Universal indignation in USA
Even FDR’s strongest critics agreed on need for retaliation
Day after Pearl attack Congress passed resolution declaring war
Only single vote against
Germany and Italy knew nothing about plan to attack Pearl but declared war on US December 11^th

Subsequent Controversy

Over responsibility for Pearl Harbor disaster
It was asked why it hadn’t been anticipated and steps taken to repel it especially as US had broken Japanese diplomatic code and could read messages between Tokyo and Japanese representatives in US
Revisionist historians say FDR knew attack was coming and exposed the fleet to it so he could unite US behind him
Administration did know an attack was coming but intercepted dispatches gave no hint where the blow would fall
US leaders thought Malaya, Dutch East Indies and possibly Philippines were the target
Few believed Japan foolhardy enough to attack Hawaii
Few thought they had the capacity to do it all simultaneously
Basic reason for Pearl Harbor debacle was miscalculation, misunderstanding, negligence and misfortune
Material in decoded intercepts wasn’t properly evaluated or effectively distributed
Commanders in Hawaii should have taken more precautions
When radar detected Japanese planes it was thought they were US B17s
US left crippled for a time in the Pacific

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