Question 1

How important was Militarism as a cause of The First World War?

Paragraph One

• The opening paragraph needs to look at the complex relationship between military planning and decision making

• This relationship was governed partly by the position of the armed forces in any given country and partly by the extent of civilian control over those forces.

• Decisions were influenced by the character and ramifications of:

  • a) programmes for armaments

  • b) strategies

  • c) precise operational intentions

• Key factor – the extent to which each country was influenced by militarist values because this would determine its readiness to accept war with other states

• Analyse the extent of such pressures on each European country’s attitude plus development of events in the run up to war 1914

Paragraph Two

Here we examine the attitude of the military in each relevant state in 1914

• Of the major European powers only Great Britain lacked a large conscript army

• Rapid industrialisation in19th century led to emergence of radical schools of thought opposed to militarism:

  • a) France – syndicalists and socialists opposed extension of conscription (compulsory military service) from 2 to 3 years (1913)

  • b) Germany – although German army and its Prussian military values appears not to have been under strict civilian control, the social democratic movement was sufficient to deter a path that would result in conflict

Paragraph Three

Examine the effect of Anglo-German relations on the strategic thinking of both countries:

1. Germany

• German strategic thinking was contradictory – 1905 Schlieffen Plan for war with France and Russia required a neutral Great Britain

• But Tirpitz’s naval expansion programme to challenge Great Britain naval supremacy depended on Russian neutrality

• Result – German military and naval planning was an important factor in aggravating their sense of encirclement

2. Great Britain

• 1889 decided to adopt the 2 power standard in naval strength

• This reflects anxiety about security (dependent on sea-power)

• German naval expansion aggravated this fear forcing Liberal Government of 1906 to increase naval construction to maintain supremacy

• Experience in Boer War led to Haldane’s army reforms

• Anglo-French Entente (1904) had potential for further co-operation

• No-evidence that decision-making pre-1914 had been assumed by the military

Paragraph Four

Now look at results of inability to limit the naval arms race with Germany

• Great Britain sucked into closer relations with France and to lesser extent with Russia

• 1912 Haldane mission to Berlin failed

• Germans willing to slow naval building if Great Britain guaranteed to remain neutral in a European War

• Economic interests of both states would make limitation of naval building problematic

Paragraph Five

This concerns France and the Moroccan question

• Links Anglo-German naval rivalry with French colonial ambition in North Africa.

• Consolidated Anglo-French Entente

• By 1913 general acceptance of extension of conscription (still some dissent though)

• French knew that without Russian help war with Germany not feasible

Paragraph Six

This concerns Russian army

• Reputation restored after war of 1904/5

• Caused concern in Germany; France encouraged by it

• Possible that belief in Russian army’s potency led to German implementation of Schlieffen Plan (1914)

Paragraph Seven

Hapsburg Empire (Austria-Hungary) and Serbian problem

• Austrian army strongest unifying force in this multi-racial empire

• Efficiency impaired by inadequate funding

• Determination to eliminate Serbia as a threat

• Civilian government in Serbia might be unable to control army whose confidence was enhanced by successes in Balkan Wars

Paragraph Eight

Estimate the risk factors in pre-1914 national policies

• Each government was alert to the military and naval preparations of other states

• It’s easy to talk of reducing arms but their would be social and economic consequences

• Germany set the pace – determined to shift the balance of power even at the risk of war

• Highest degree of risk? – German Schlieffen Plan and Austrian determination to deal with Serbia.

Paragraph Nine

Attitudes of the various European powers to chance of outbreak of war:

• France – wanted Alsace-Lorraine but reluctant to start a war

• Russia – confidence in her army (misplaced) and perhaps confident if it came to war

• Germany – fear of war on 2 fronts; especially against Russian “steamroller” (army)

• Great Britain – wanted to avoid war but did little to do so

• Plans implemented in 1914 formed from national strategic doctrines, command structure and technical capacity

• War proved more destructive than ever imagined – 4 empires were to disappear ; German, Hapsburg, Russian and Ottoman (Turkish)