Question 5

Was Cavour’s diplomacy more important than Garibaldi’s actions in the struggle for Italian Unification?

• Looking at Cavour’s diplomacy – did he have far-seeing plans for unification with diplomacy accordingly pre-arranged, or did he respond to circumstances to get advantage for unification (on Piedmontese terms if possible)?
• Involvement in Crimean War - Cavour cultivating Great Power support for a pre-planned unification exercise?
• More likely to be a response to Anglo-French pressure to force Austrian entry into the war
• Central is the 1858 meeting with Louis Napoleon at Plombieres
• 2 possibilities:
  • Cavour tried to embroil France in war with Austria with his pre-conceived aim being the Piedmontisation of northern and central Italy
  • Or he took advantage of French policy
• France’s gains:
  • Nice and Savoy
  • The proposed Papal Confederation abandoned
  • Austria defeated by Franco-Piedmontese force
• 1859 war drove Austria out of Lombardy
• After Magenta and Solferino France forced the early peace of Villafranca which denied Cavour the full rewards of victory – he resigned
• 1860 back in power and manipulated plebiscites in the Duchies securing union with Piedmont
• Secured French support by confirming cession of Nice and Savoy
• Louis Napoleon against the formation of a strong united Italian state which might challenge France’s strength in Europe
• Cavour has been given the credit for successfully manipulating the French to ease their fears and retain their support for his unification plans

The Climax

• It is Cavour’s response to Garibaldi’s Sicilian expedition of 1860
• There may be doubts concerning Cavour’s commitment to unification but it is not the case with Garibaldi ;
  • Fiery Mazzinian Republican frustrated by Cavour’s hesitant diplomacy
  • His military ability shown in successful invasion of Sicily and southern Italy
  • This precipitated the final stage of unification which would not have happened so soon otherwise
  • His penchant for direct action shown in his earlier defence of Rome (1849) and as a dreamer of unrealistic military enterprises
  • Note the contrast with Cavour’s diplomacy – shows Garibaldi’s lack of understanding of the complexity of problems facing unification
  • Unlikely that his direct action would have achieved unification unaided
  • His success in 1860 brought Cavour’s response which forestalled international intervention as Garibaldi moved to capture Rome
  • Garibaldi distrusted by Cavour and acted to control events in the interests of Victor Emanuel
• Piedmontese invasion of Papal states contained Garibaldi’s initiative
• 1861 Kingdom of Italy
• Seems that Garibaldi bounced Cavour into actions resulting in the unification
• The big question – how far did Cavour create a desired unified Italy, or how far was he led as an opportunist to change his approach by Garibaldi, from limited Piedmontisation to the incorporation of the whole of Italy.